Information Dissemination, Competitive Pressure, and Politician Performance between Elections: A Field Experiment in Uganda

@article{Grossman2018InformationDC,
  title={Information Dissemination, Competitive Pressure, and Politician Performance between Elections: A Field Experiment in Uganda},
  author={G. Grossman and Kristin Michelitch},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  year={2018},
  volume={112},
  pages={280 - 301}
}
Politicians shirk when their performance is obscure to constituents. We theorize that when politician performance information is disseminated early in the electoral term, politicians will subsequently improve their performance in anticipation of changes in citizens’ evaluative criteria and possible challenger entry in the next election. However, politicians may only respond in constituencies where opposition has previously mounted. We test these predictions in partnership with a Ugandan civil… Expand
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The results indicate that communication technologies can combine with data on budget management to help voters make better informed choices at the polls and thus have the potential to enhance local electoral accountability by providing information that is difficult for politicians to control and manipulate. Expand
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