Information Dissemination, Competitive Pressure, and Politician Performance between Elections: A Field Experiment in Uganda

@article{Grossman2018InformationDC,
  title={Information Dissemination, Competitive Pressure, and Politician Performance between Elections: A Field Experiment in Uganda},
  author={Guy Grossman and Kristin Michelitch},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  year={2018},
  volume={112},
  pages={280 - 301}
}
Politicians shirk when their performance is obscure to constituents. We theorize that when politician performance information is disseminated early in the electoral term, politicians will subsequently improve their performance in anticipation of changes in citizens’ evaluative criteria and possible challenger entry in the next election. However, politicians may only respond in constituencies where opposition has previously mounted. We test these predictions in partnership with a Ugandan civil… 

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