Information Design , Bayesian Persuasion , and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium Information Design , Bayesian Persuasion , and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

@inproceedings{Bergemann2016InformationD,
  title={Information Design , Bayesian Persuasion , and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium Information Design , Bayesian Persuasion , and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium},
  author={Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris},
  year={2016}
}
* Bergemann: Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511 (e-mail: dirk.bergemann@yale.edu); Morris: Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 (e-mail: smorris@princeton.edu). We acknowledge financial support from NSF SES 1459899. We would like to thank our discussant, Drew Fudenberg, and Ben Brooks, Jeff Ely, Emir Kamenica, Laurent Mathevet, and Tymofiy Mylanov for informative comments, and Xinyang Wang for valuable research assistance. † Go to http… CONTINUE READING
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