Information Content of Coevolutionary Game Landscapes

  title={Information Content of Coevolutionary Game Landscapes},
  author={Hendrik Richter},
  journal={2018 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC)},
  • Hendrik Richter
  • Published 20 March 2018
  • Economics
  • 2018 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC)
Coevolutionary game dynamics is the result of players that may change their strategies and their network of interaction. For such games, and based on interpreting strategies as configurations, strategy-to-payoff maps can be defined for every interaction network, which opens up to derive game landscapes. This paper presents an analysis of these game landscapes by their information content. By this analysis, we particularly study the effect of a rescaled payoff matrix generalizing social dilemmas… 

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