Information Asymmetries in Pay-Per-Bid Auctions: How Swoopo Makes Bank

@article{Byers2010InformationAI,
  title={Information Asymmetries in Pay-Per-Bid Auctions: How Swoopo Makes Bank},
  author={John W. Byers and Michael Mitzenmacher and Georgios Zervas},
  journal={CoRR},
  year={2010},
  volume={abs/1001.0592}
}
Innovative auction methods can be exploited to increase profits, with Shubik’s famous “dollar auction” [11] perhaps being the most widely known example. Recently, some mainstream e-commerce web sites have apparently achieved the same end on a much broader scale, by using “pay-per-bid” auctions to sell items, from video games to bars of gold. In these auctions, bidders incur a cost for placing each bid in addition to (or sometimes in lieu of) the winner’s final purchase cost. Thus even when a… CONTINUE READING