Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President's Office of Management and Budget

@article{Haeder2015InfluenceAT,
  title={Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President's Office of Management and Budget},
  author={Simon F. Haeder and Susan Webb Yackee},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  year={2015},
  volume={109},
  pages={507 - 522}
}
All administrative processes contain points of entry for politics, and the U.S. president's use of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review government regulations is no exception. Specifically, OMB review can open up a pathway for interest groups to lobby for policy change. We theorize that interest group lobbying can be influential during OMB review, especially when there is consensus across groups. We use a selection model to test our argument with more than 1,500 regulations… 
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