# Infinite-Duration All-Pay Bidding Games

@inproceedings{Avni2021InfiniteDurationAB,
title={Infinite-Duration All-Pay Bidding Games},
author={Guy Avni and Isma{\"e}l Jecker and Dorde Zikelic},
booktitle={SODA},
year={2021}
}
• Published in SODA 2021
• Computer Science, Economics
A graph game is a two-player zero-sum game in which the players move a token throughout a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner or payoff of the game. In "bidding games", in each turn, we hold an 'auction' (bidding) to determine which player moves the token. The players simultaneously submit bids and the higher bidder moves the token. Several different payment schemes have been considered. In "first-price" bidding, only the higher bidder pays his bid, while in "all-pay… Expand
2 Citations

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