Corpus ID: 237491038

Inferring the prior in routing games using public signalling

  title={Inferring the prior in routing games using public signalling},
  author={Jasper Verbree and Ashish Kumar Cherukuri},
This paper considers Bayesian persuasion for routing games where information about the uncertain state of the network is provided by a traffic information system (TIS) using public signals. In this setup, the TIS commits to a signalling scheme and participants form a posterior belief about the state of the network based on prior beliefs and received signal. They subsequently select routes minimizing their individual expected travel time under their posterior beliefs, giving rise to a Wardrop… Expand

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