Corpus ID: 169142411

Inexpressible Truths and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument

@inproceedings{Hellie2004InexpressibleTA,
  title={Inexpressible Truths and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument},
  author={Benj Hellie},
  year={2004}
}
Dualism is a perpetually seductive doctrine; the Knowledge Argument for dualism (Jackson, 1982) a particularly alluring source of support for the doctrine. Jackson advocated the soundness of the argument for nearly two decades before changing his mind; I and many of my comrades, before we became sophisticated, found the allure of the argument as Jackson presents it hard to avoid; many other philosophers doubtless have had this experience as well. And, as Stoljar and Nagasawa (2003, §§1–2… Expand
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