Corpus ID: 11014425

Inefficient Equilibria of Second-Price / English Auctions with Resale Rod Garratt

  title={Inefficient Equilibria of Second-Price / English Auctions with Resale Rod Garratt},
  author={Thomas Tr{\"o}ger and C. Zheng},
  • Thomas Tröger, C. Zheng
  • Published 2006
  • In second-price or English auctions involving symmetric, independent, private-value bidders the equilibrium outcome may not be efficient if resale is allowed. In addition to the efficient, symmetric equilibrium there exist inefficient, asymmetric equilibria in which the bidder who wins the item offers it for resale to the losers. For the case where the reserve price in the initial auction equals zero, we show that any surplus between the first best and that of a market where one bidder is a… CONTINUE READING
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