Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria

@article{Dubey1986InefficiencyON,
  title={Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria},
  author={Pradeep Dubey},
  journal={Math. Oper. Res.},
  year={1986},
  volume={11},
  pages={1-8}
}
  • P. Dubey
  • Published 1 February 1986
  • Economics
  • Math. Oper. Res.
It is shown that Nash Equilibria of smooth games generally tend to be inefficient in the Pareto sense. 

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