Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts

  title={Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts},
  author={Brett V. Benson and Adam Meirowitz and Kristopher W. Ramsay},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={307 - 335}
Do military alliances foster aggressive behavior in allies to the point of undermining the security goal of the alliance? Like others, we find that alliance commitments may cause moral hazard because allies do not fully internalize the costs of actions that can lead to war. But unlike others, we show that the effect of moral hazard can improve security. Moral hazard can be the driving force behind generating deterrence and avoiding costly conflict. Aggressors may refrain from initiating crises… 

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