Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

  title={Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?},
  author={Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West},
  journal={Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  pages={645 - 665}
Much research in the last two decades has demonstrated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision making and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be interpreted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit… 

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  • L. Cohen
  • Psychology
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 1981
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