Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games

@inproceedings{Yamamoto2014IndividualLA,
  title={Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games},
  author={Yuichi Yamamoto},
  year={2014}
}
We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions and/or the monitoring structure. Each player privately learns the state over time but cannot observe what the opponent learned. We show that there are robust equilibria in which players eventually obtain… CONTINUE READING

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