Individual Fairness in Advertising Auctions Through Inverse Proportionality

  title={Individual Fairness in Advertising Auctions Through Inverse Proportionality},
  author={Shuchi Chawla and Meena Jagadeesan},
Recent empirical work demonstrates that online advertisement can exhibit bias in the delivery of ads across users even when all advertisers bid in a non-discriminatory manner. We study the design ad auctions that, given fair bids, are guaranteed to produce fair outcomes. Following the works of Dwork and Ilvento [11] and Chawla et al. [7], our goal is to design a truthful auction that satisfies “individual fairness” in its outcomes: informally speaking, users that are similar to each other… 

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