Indiscernible universals

  title={Indiscernible universals},
  author={Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra},
  pages={604 - 624}
Abstract Universals have traditionally thought to obey the identity of indiscernibles, that is, it has traditionally been thought that there can be no perfectly similar universals. But at least in the conception of universals as immanent, there is nothing that rules out there being indiscernible universals. In this paper, I shall argue that there is useful work indiscernible universals can do, and so there might be reason to postulate indiscernible universals. In particular, I shall argue that… 
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