Indirect epistemic reasons and religious belief

@article{Lougheed2017IndirectER,
  title={Indirect epistemic reasons and religious belief},
  author={Kirk Lougheed and R. Simpson},
  journal={Religious Studies},
  year={2017},
  volume={53},
  pages={151-169}
}
If believing P will result in epistemically good outcomes, does this generate an epistemic reason to believe P, or just a pragmatic reason? Conceiving of such reasons as epistemic reasons seems to lead to absurdity, e.g. by allowing that someone can rationally hold beliefs that conflict with her assessment of her evidence's probative force. We explain how this and other intuitively unwelcome results can be avoided. We also suggest a positive case for conceiving of such reasons as epistemic… Expand
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