Incumbent performance and electoral control

  title={Incumbent performance and electoral control},
  author={J. Ferejohn},
  journal={Public Choice},
In the pure theory of electoral competition, citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred. Candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office. Models of this sort have been developed in both static [McKelvey (1975)] and dynamic [Kramer (1977)I settings, and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is "large enough" in some sense, equilibrium platforms rarely exist. But these models have… Expand
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