Increasable Supply and “ Collusive-Seeming Equilibria ” in the Uniform-Price Auction

@inproceedings{McAdams1999IncreasableSA,
  title={Increasable Supply and “ Collusive-Seeming Equilibria ” in the Uniform-Price Auction},
  author={David McAdams},
  year={1999}
}
When supply is fixed in advance, the uniform-price share auction is vulnerable to “collusive-seeming equilibria” in which the realized price is less than a lower bound on all bidder’s per share value vi. Our main result is that no collusive-seeming equilibria exist in a variation of the single-price auction in which the auctioneer sets supply so as to maximize profits after receiving bidders’ announced demand schedules. Lack of precommitment to quantity levels, especially the ability to… CONTINUE READING