Incomplete Language as an Incentive Device

  title={Incomplete Language as an Incentive Device},
  author={P{\'e}ter Es and Dezs{\"o} Szalay},
We analyze a game of strategic information transmission where the sender needs to exert costly, unobservable e¤ort to acquire information. If information is su¢ ciently costly to acquire, full information transmission cannot occur in equilibrium even in the absence of a bias in decision-making. Acquiring information and communicating a limited amount of information can occur. Under natural conditions on the distribution of types, less revealing communication provides stronger incentives for… CONTINUE READING

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