Incomplete Information , Incentive Compatibility , and the Core *

@inproceedings{Vohra1999IncompleteI,
  title={Incomplete Information , Incentive Compatibility , and the Core *},
  author={Rajiv Vohra},
  year={1999}
}
We consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time of engaging in state contingent contracts. While communication of private information is permitted, the true information state is not verifiable. The enforcement of contracts is, therefore, limited by incentive compatibility constraints. We formalize a notion of the core for such an economy. Our analysis can be viewed as an attempt to incorporate incentive compatibility in the coarse core of R. Wilson (1978… CONTINUE READING
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