Incomplete Contracts and Optimal Ownership of Public Goods

  title={Incomplete Contracts and Optimal Ownership of Public Goods},
  author={Patrick W. Schmitz},
  journal={CEPR Discussion Paper Series},
  • P. Schmitz
  • Published 1 September 2012
  • Economics
  • CEPR Discussion Paper Series
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered
Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information
  • P. Schmitz
  • Economics
    Journal of Public Economics
  • 2021
Customer Ownership and Quality Provision in Public Services Under Asymmetric Information
The implementation of projects producing external effects is often a source of disagreement and conflict between hosting and non-hosting communities. The paper focuses on the impact of participatory
Conflict between Citizen Ownership and the Production of Public Goods
The paper investigates the conditions under which consumer ownership should be preferred to investor ownership in economies with externalities. On making their choices investor-owners take into
Joint versus Common Ownership of Public Goods 1
We compare joint and common ownership of public goods in a repeated game. Under common ownership an owner’s access to the public good cannot be restricted by other owners while under joint ownership
Task Interdependence And Non-contractibility In Public Good Provision
In the context of public good provision, despite non-contractibility of investments, it is possible to specify who is in charge of tasks such as construction and maintenance. We show that
Does choice of contract matter for cost and quality of highways? Empirical analysis of PPPs Vs. Traditional contracts
During the last two decades, several countries have used Public Private Partnerships along with the traditional contracts for development of infrastructure. In this paper, we model the incentive


Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods
There has been a dramatic change in the division of responsibility between the state and the private sector for the delivery of public goods and services in recent years with an increasing trend
Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks
This chapter offers a new perspective on the boundaries between public and private firms. Suppose the government wants a certain good or service to be provided. According to the property rights
Reputation and Ownership of Public Goods
This paper analyzes the effect of reputation on ownership of public goods in the Besley and Ghatak (2001) model. We show that in the dynamic setup the optimal ownership depends not only on the
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting
Recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral trade even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting. These studies typically considered
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach
The property rights approach to the theory of the firm suggests that ownership structures are chosen in order to provide ex ante investment incentives, while bargaining is ex post efficient. In
Control Rights In Complex Partnerships
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a “complex” partnership, that is, a partnership which produces impure public goods. We show that the optimal
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Our theory of costly contracts emphasizes that contractual rights can be of two types: specific rights and residual rights. When it is costly to list all specific rights over assets in the contract,
Nature of human capital, technology and ownership of public goods
Besley and Ghatak (2001) show that public good should be owned by the agent who values the public good most — irrespective of technological factors. In this paper we relax their assumptions in a
Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment
This paper examines the efficiency of expectation damages as a breach remedy in a bilateral trade setting with renegotiation and relationship-specific investment by the buyer and the seller. As
Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand?
The paper takes stock of the advances and directions for research on the incomplete contracting front. It first illustrates some of the main ideas of the incomplete contract literature through an