Incomplete Contracts, Intellectual Property and Institutional Complementarities

  title={Incomplete Contracts, Intellectual Property and Institutional Complementarities},
  author={Ugo Pagano and Maria Alessandra Rossi},
  journal={European Journal of Law and Economics},
In the New Property Rights model ownership of assets should be assigned to the most capable agents. While, in a world of incomplete contracts, the application of the model to IPRs provides insights on the nature of their second best allocation, suggesting a direction of causation going from technology to property rights, also the opposite direction of causation may arise: owners of IPRs tend to develop more capabilities in the production of new IPRs. For some firms and countries, a virtuous… 
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