Inclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference

@article{Priest2010InclosuresVA,
  title={Inclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference},
  author={Graham Priest},
  journal={Notre Dame J. Formal Log.},
  year={2010},
  volume={51},
  pages={69-84}
}
  • G. Priest
  • Published 20 January 2010
  • Philosophy
  • Notre Dame J. Formal Log.
In this paper, I start by showing that sorites paradoxes are inclosure paradoxes. That is, they fit the Inclosure Scheme which characterizes the paradoxes of self-reference. Given that sorites and self-referential paradoxes are of the same kind, they should have the same kind of solution. The rest of the paper investigates what a dialetheic solution to sorites paradoxes is like, connections with a dialetheic solution to the self-referential paradoxes, and related issues— especially so called… 
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