Incentivising Participation in Liquid Democracy with Breadth First Delegation

@inproceedings{Kotsialou2020IncentivisingPI,
  title={Incentivising Participation in Liquid Democracy with Breadth First Delegation},
  author={Grammateia Kotsialou and Luke Riley},
  booktitle={AAMAS},
  year={2020}
}
Liquid democracy allows members of an electorate to either directly vote over alternatives, or delegate their voting rights to someone they trust. Most of the liquid democracy literature and implementations allow each voter to nominate only one delegate per election. However, if that delegate abstains, the voting rights assigned to her are left unused. To minimise the number of unused delegations, it has been suggested that each voter should declare a personal ranking over voters she trusts. In… 

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