Incentives in the family II: behavioral dynamics and the evolution of non-costly signaling.

@article{Akay2012IncentivesIT,
  title={Incentives in the family II: behavioral dynamics and the evolution of non-costly signaling.},
  author={Erol Akçay},
  journal={Journal of theoretical biology},
  year={2012},
  volume={294},
  pages={
          9-18
        }
}
In many biological and social interactions, individuals with private information have incentives to misrepresent their information. A prominent example is when offspring know their need or condition but the parents do not. Theory showed that signal costs can ensure truthful communication in such situations, but further studies have cast in doubt whether empirically measured costs are high enough to sustain honesty, and whether the costly signaling equilibrium represents a fitness advantage over… CONTINUE READING
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