Incentives and Selection in Cyclical Absenteeism

@inproceedings{Arai2003IncentivesAS,
  title={Incentives and Selection in Cyclical Absenteeism},
  author={Masaaki Arai and Peter Skogman Thoursie},
  year={2003}
}
Procyclical absenteeism might be due to the higher sick rates of marginal workers, or be a consequence of procyclical incentives to report sick. These hypotheses predict opposite signs for the correlation between sick rates and shares of temporary contracts. Workers on temporary contracts are associated with lower job security in comparison with workers on time-unlimited contracts, implying that temporary employees run the highest risk of lay-off and are expected to have stronger incentives for… CONTINUE READING

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