Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions

@article{Bhattacharya2010IncentiveCB,
  title={Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions},
  author={S. Bhattacharya and Vincent Conitzer and K. Munagala and Lirong Xia},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2010},
  volume={abs/0904.3501}
}
  • S. Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, +1 author Lirong Xia
  • Published 2010
  • Economics, Computer Science, Mathematics
  • ArXiv
  • In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budget constraints. When only the valuations are private and the budgets are public, Dobzinski et al [8] show that the adaptive clinching auction is the unique incentive-compatible auction achieving Pareto-optimality. They further show that this auction is not truthful with private budgets, so that there is no… CONTINUE READING
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