Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Influential Agent Selection

  title={Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Influential Agent Selection},
  author={Xiuzhen Zhang and Yao Zhang and Dengji Zhao},
Selecting the most influential agent in a network has huge practical value in applications. However, in many scenarios, the graph structure can only be known from agents’ reports on their connections. In a self-interested setting, agents may strategically hide some connections to make themselves seem to be more important. In this paper, we study the incentive compatible (IC) selection mechanism to prevent such manipulations. Specifically, we model the progeny of an agent as her influence power… Expand

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