Incentive Compatibility in a Market with Indivisible Goods *

  title={Incentive Compatibility in a Market with Indivisible Goods *},
  author={Alvin E. Roth},
This note shows that in a market where each trader’s initial endowment is one unit of an indivisible good, there is a procedure for reaching a competitive allocation that makes it a dominant strategy for each player to reveal his true preferences over all goods in the market. Shapley and Scarf (1974) showed that a competitive allocation always exists in such a market. Roth and Postlewaite (1977) showed that when no trader is indifferent between any goods, this competitive allocation is unique… CONTINUE READING
Highly Influential
This paper has highly influenced 10 other papers. REVIEW HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL CITATIONS

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.
62 Citations
1 References
Similar Papers


Publications referenced by this paper.

The economics of matching: Stability and incentives

  • preparation. Roth, E Alvin
  • 1982

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…