Incentive Compatibility in Stochastic Dynamic Systems

@article{Ma2021IncentiveCI,
  title={Incentive Compatibility in Stochastic Dynamic Systems},
  author={Ke Ma and P. Kumar},
  journal={IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control},
  year={2021},
  volume={66},
  pages={651-666}
}
  • Ke Ma, P. Kumar
  • Published 2021
  • Computer Science, Economics, Mathematics
  • IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
The classic Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism ensures incentive compatibility, i.e., truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all agents, for a static one-shot game. However, it does not appear to be feasible to construct mechanisms that ensure dominance of dynamic truth-telling for agents comprised of general stochastic dynamic systems. The agents’ intertemporal net utilities depend on future controls and payments, and a direct extension of the VCG mechanism does not guarantee incentive… Expand
Incentivizing Truthful Reporting from Strategic Sensors in Dynamical Systems

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