• Corpus ID: 88522856

In elections, irrelevant alternatives provide relevant data

@article{Darlington2017InEI,
  title={In elections, irrelevant alternatives provide relevant data},
  author={Richard B. Darlington},
  journal={arXiv: Methodology},
  year={2017}
}
The electoral criterion of independence of irrelevant alternatives, or IIA, states that a voting system is unacceptable if it would choose a different winner if votes were recounted after one of the losers had dropped out. But IIA confuses the candidate who withdrew with the data which was generated by that candidate. This paper reports a wide variety of simulation studies which consistently show that data from dropout candidates can be very useful in choosing the best of the remaining… 

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