In analogy with Moore’s founding question to metaethics, the central problem of a metatheory of meaning is the meaning of ‘meaning’. In answering the latter question, Gibbard’s Meaning and Normativ-
@inproceedings{Gibbard2013InAW,
title={In analogy with Moore’s founding question to metaethics, the central problem of a metatheory of meaning is the meaning of ‘meaning’. In answering the latter question, Gibbard’s Meaning and Normativ-},
author={A. Gibbard},
year={2013}
}In analogy with Moore's founding question to metaethics, the central problem of a metatheory of meaning is the meaning of 'meaning'. In answering the latter question, Gibbard's Meaning and Normativ-ity retains far-reaching Moorean ambitions about the main semantic concept: it applies classical metaethical arguments, strategies and distinctions to reach inviting, non-naturalistic conclusions about the concept of meaning. At the outset, Gibbard interprets the normativity of meaning in two senses… CONTINUE READING