In Defense of Sensitivity

@article{Black2005InDO,
  title={In Defense of Sensitivity},
  author={Tim Black and P. Murphy},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2005},
  volume={154},
  pages={53-71}
}
The sensitivity condition on knowledge says that one knows that P only if one would not believe that P if P were false. Difficulties for this condition are now well documented. Keith DeRose has recently suggested a revised sensitivity condition that is designed to avoid some of these difficulties. We argue, however, that there are decisive objections to DeRose’s revised condition. Yet rather than simply abandoning his proposed condition, we uncover a rationale for its adoption, a rationale… Expand

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