Implications of the bidders' arrival process on the design of online auctions

@article{Vakrat2000ImplicationsOT,
  title={Implications of the bidders' arrival process on the design of online auctions},
  author={Yaniv Vakrat and Abraham Seidmann},
  journal={Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences},
  year={2000},
  pages={7 pp. vol.1-}
}
  • Yaniv Vakrat, A. Seidmann
  • Published 4 January 2000
  • Economics
  • Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
We have recently seen a tremendous number of auctions conducted over the Internet. This form of electronic commerce is rapidly growing, and it is projected to account for 30% of all e-commerce by 2002. Using actual bidding transaction data from 324 business-to-consumer online auctions, we analyzed the bidders' arrival process during each auction. We found that most bidders like to sign on early in the auction; typically, 70% of the bidders sign on during the first half. Our statistical analysis… 

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