Implementing Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audits in California

@article{Hall2009ImplementingRP,
  title={Implementing Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audits in California},
  author={Joseph Lorenzo Hall and Philip B. Stark and Luke Miratrix and Melvin Briones and Elaine Ginnold and Freddie Oakley and Martin Peaden and Gail Pellerin and Tom Stanionis and Tricia Webber},
  journal={LSN: Law \& Economics: Public Law (Topic)},
  year={2009}
}
Risk-limiting postelection audits limit the chance of certifying an electoral outcome if the outcome is not what a full hand count would show. Building on previous work [18, 17, 20, 21, 11], we report pilot risk-limiting audits in four elections during 2008 in three California counties: one during the February 2008 Primary Election in Marin County and three during the November 2008 General Elections in Marin, Santa Cruz and Yolo Counties. We explain what makes an audit risk-limiting and how… 
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Efficient Post-Election Audits of Multiple Contests: 2009 California Tests
TLDR
Three refinements to increase efficiency were tested in Marin and Yolo counties, California, in November 2009, and all three can be used together, resulting in extremely efficient risk-limiting audits.
Risk-Limiting Postelection Audits: Conservative $P$-Values From Common Probability Inequalities
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TLDR
This paper gives simple approaches to calculating a conservative P-value for several ways of summarizing overstatements andSeveral ways of drawing the sample of batches to audit, emphasizing sampling with probability proportional to a bound up on the error in the pth audit batch (PPEB sampling).
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