• Corpus ID: 252439058

Implementation with Uncertain Evidence

@inproceedings{Banerjee2022ImplementationWU,
  title={Implementation with Uncertain Evidence},
  author={Soumen Banerjee and Yi-Chun Chen},
  year={2022}
}
We study a full implementation problem with hard evidence where the state is common knowledge but agents face uncertainty about the evidence endowments of other agents. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition for implementation in mixed-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria called No Perfect Deceptions. The implementing mechanism requires only two agents and a finite message space, imposes transfers only off the equilibrium, and invoke no device with ”...questionable features...” such as… 

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We study full implementation with evidence in an environment with bounded utilities. We show that a social choice function is Nash implementable in a direct revelation mechanism if and only if it

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An evidence game is a strategic disclosure game in which an informed agent who has some pieces of verifiable evidence decides which ones to disclose to an uninformed principal who chooses a reward.

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In a class of I‐agent mechanism design problems with evidence, commitment is unnecessary, randomization has no value, and robust incentive compatibility has no cost, and certain costly verification models can be characterized using equilibrium analysis of an associated model of evidence.

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This paper examines the impact of placing natural restrictions on the mechanisms considered for implementation problems. It is shown that if all mechanisms are considered and preferences satisfy a

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