• Corpus ID: 252439058

Implementation with Uncertain Evidence

@inproceedings{Banerjee2022ImplementationWU,
  title={Implementation with Uncertain Evidence},
  author={Soumen Banerjee and Yi-Chun Chen},
  year={2022}
}

• Soumen Banerjee, Yi-Chun Chen
• Published 22 September 2022
• Economics

We study a full implementation problem with hard evidence where the state is common knowledge but agents face uncertainty about the evidence endowments of other agents. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition for implementation in mixed-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria called No Perfect Deceptions. The implementing mechanism requires only two agents and a finite message space, imposes transfers only off the equilibrium, and invoke no device with ”...questionable features...” such as integer or modulo games. Requiring only implementation in pure-strategy equilibria weakens the necessary and sufficient condition to No Pure-Perfect Deceptions. In general type spaces where the state is not common knowledge, a condition called higher-order measurability is necessary and sufficient for rationalizable implementation with arbitrarily small transfers alongside.