Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms

  title={Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms},
  author={Matthew O. Jackson},
  journal={The Review of Economic Studies},
  • M. Jackson
  • Published 1 September 1992
  • Economics
  • The Review of Economic Studies
This paper examines the impact of placing natural restrictions on the mechanisms considered for implementation problems. It is shown that if all mechanisms are considered and preferences satisfy a basic condition, then any social choice correspondence can be implemented in undominated strategies. An example points out that the strength of this result derives from the use of mechanisms with questionable features. In part of the message space the agent who announces the highest integer is… 
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