Implementation by mediated equilibrium

  title={Implementation by mediated equilibrium},
  author={Bezalel Peleg and Ariel D. Procaccia},
  journal={Int. J. Game Theory},
Implementation theory tackles the following problem: given a social choice correspondence, find a decentralized mechanism such that for every constellation of the individuals’ preferences, the set of outcomes in equilibrium is exactly the set of socially optimal alternatives (as specified by the correspondence). In this paper we are concerned with implementation by mediated equilibrium; under such an equilibrium, a mediator coordinates the players’ strategies in a way that discourages deviation… CONTINUE READING
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