Implementation and Renegotiation

@article{Maskin1998ImplementationAR,
  title={Implementation and Renegotiation},
  author={Eric Maskin and John. Moore},
  journal={Public Choice \& Political Economy eJournal},
  year={1998}
}
The paper characterises the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism. 
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References

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In this article, we analyze the canonical hold-up model of Hart and Moore under the assumption that the courts can verify delivery of the good by the seller. It is shown that no further renegotiation
Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences
This paper explores how the requirement that the implementation of contracts be renegotiation-proof affects the set of contracts that can be implemented in a seller-buyer scenario in which the
Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
The paper considers a hold-up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will prove to be efficient, and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be prevented. As the
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
When drawing up a contract, it is often impracticable to specify all the relevant contingencies, and so contracts are typically incomplete. This paper considers the extent to which these gaps migh t
The Theory of Implementation of Socially Optimal Decisions in Economics
Introduction - Economies with Public Goods - Resource Allocation Mechanisms - Dominant Strategies and Direct Mechanisms - Implementation in Nash Equilibria (I): General Results - Implementation in
Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
The authors examine the effects of renegotiation in an agency relationship. They show how renegotiation affects (1) the set of actions the principal can induce the agent to take and (2) the cost of
Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
We scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature. This literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of
Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
An optimal contract design problem is considered. Contracts which are incomplete and simple are used to investigate the extent to which constrained revisions can mitigate inefficiencies resulting
Subgame Perfect Implementation
This paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules. It is shown that, in many
Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
In the last few years, a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of 'incomplete contracting'. However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for
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