Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations∗

Abstract

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not eventually play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers C70, C78.

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@inproceedings{Cripps2002ImperfectMA, title={Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations∗}, author={Martin W. Cripps and George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson}, year={2002} }