Corpus ID: 53580913

Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness

  title={Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness},
  author={Keith Frankish},
Theories of consciousness typically address the hard problem. They accept that phenomenal consciousness is real and aim to explain how it comes to exist. There is, however, another approach, which holds that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion and aims to explain why it seems to exist. We might call this eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness. The term is not ideal, however, suggesting as it does that belief in phenomenal consciousness is simply a theoretical error, that rejection of… Expand

Figures from this paper

The Normative Challenge for Illusionist Views of Consciousness
  • F. Kammerer
  • Philosophy
  • Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy
  • 2019
Illusionists about phenomenal consciousness claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist but merely seems to exist. At the same time, it is quite intuitive for there to be some kind of linkExpand
Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem
Abstract Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one doesExpand
The illusion of conscious experience
A new theory of phenomenal introspection is presented and it is argued that it might deal with the task at hand and defend the apparent absurdity of illusionism. Expand
Illusionist Integrated Information Theory
It is argued that the resulting theory illusionist integrated information theory removes several problems for IIT including the hard problem and the logic gate problem, and also enables meaningful progress for illusionists on solving the illusion problem. Expand
The False Problem of Consciousness
Philosophers have usually dealt with the problem of consciousness but, in the last decades, neurobiologists have undertaken the daunting task to address it scientifically. In particular, to answerExpand
Illusionism: an Argument for Its Incoherence
In his recent paper on the meta-problem of consciousness, Chalmers (J Conscious Stud 25(9–10):6–66, 2018) claims that illusionism is one of the best reductionist theories available and that it is notExpand
A hundred years of consciousness: “a long training in absurdity”
There occurred in the twentieth century the most remarkable episode in the history of human thought. A number of thinkers denied the existence of something we know with certainty to exist:Expand
The Interface Theory of Perception and the Science of Consciousness
In his book “Galileo’s Error”, Philip Goff lays out what he calls “foundations for a new science of consciousness”, which are decidedly anti-physicalist (panpsychist), motivated by a critique ofExpand
Toward a standard model of consciousness: Reconciling the attention schema, global workspace, higher-order thought, and illusionist theories
How people’s understanding of consciousness may have been shaped by an implicit theory of mind is examined to help to make sense of an apparent divide between the physically incoherent consciousness the authors think they have and the complex, rich, but mechanistic consciousness they may actually have. Expand
The Meta-Problem of Consciousness
The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness.1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition,Expand


Consciousness, Color, and Content
Experiences and feelings are inherently conscious states. There is something it is like to feel pain, to have an itch, to experience bright red. Philosophers call this sort of consciousnessExpand
Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness
Conscious experience presents a deep puzzle. On the one hand, a fairly robust materialism must be true in order to explain how it is that conscious events causally interact with non-conscious,Expand
Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness
In the years since Daniel Dennett's influential Consciousness Explained was published in 1991, scientific research on consciousness has been a hotly contested battleground of rival theories -- "soExpand
Abstract The “Classical” philosophical view of concepts as having necessary and sufficient defining conditions has fallen on hard times, supposedly both in philosophy and psychology. I will argue,Expand
Conceptualizing physical consciousness
Theories that combine physicalism with phenomenal concepts abandon the phenomenal irrealism characteristic of 1950s physicalism, thereby leaving physicalists trying to reconcile themselves toExpand
Is consciousness a brain process?
  • U. T. Place
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • British journal of psychology
  • 1956
The thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain is put forward as a reasonable scientific hypothesis, and it is suggested that the authors can identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity, if they can explain the subject's introspective observations by reference to the brain processes with which they are correlated. Expand
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind
Part 1 The ten problems - phenomenal consciousness introduced, the problem of ownership, the problem of perspectival subjectivity, the problem of mechanism, the problem of phenomenal causation, theExpand
The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief
Experiences and beliefs are different sorts of mental states, and are often taken to belong to very different domains. Experiences are paradigmatically phenomenal, characterized by what it is like toExpand
Is the visual world a grand illusion
In this paper I explore a brand of scepticism about perceptual experience that takes its start from recent work in psychology and philosophy of mind on change blindness and related phenomena. I argueExpand
Quining diet qualia
  • K. Frankish
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • Consciousness and Cognition
  • 2012
It is argued that there is no phenomenal residue left when qualia are stripped of their intrinsicality, ineffability, and subjectivity, and that the diet notion of qualia has no distinctive content. Expand