If not non-cognitivism, then what?

@inproceedings{Pigden2009IfNN,
  title={If not non-cognitivism, then what?},
  author={C. Pigden},
  year={2009}
}
According to Michael Smith, the big issue in metaethics (what he calls “The Moral Problem”) is how to accept the seemingly true premises of Hume’s Motivation Argument while fending off its non-cognitivist conclusion, a conclusion that Smith takes to be both repugnant and false (Smith, 1994, The Moral Problem, henceforward MP). This presupposes two claims: (A) that Hume was arguing for non-cognitivism; and (B) that the Motivation Argument (as construed by non-cognitivists) is a good one, so good… Expand
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