If At First You Don't Succeed: Budgeting by a Sequence of Referenda

@inproceedings{Ladha1982IfAF,
  title={If At First You Don't Succeed: Budgeting by a Sequence of Referenda},
  author={Krishna K. Ladha and Thomas F. Romer and Rosenthal Howard.},
  year={1982}
}
An econometric model, based on the Romer-Rosenthal model of agenda control by budget-maximizing bureaucracies is used to analyze the budgetary and voting outcomes of referenda in a cross-section of Oregon school districts. In addition to estimates of the effects of agenda control, the model permits estimation of the spending effects of voter failure to perceive the .availability of lump-sum intergovernmental grants. Budgets are set via referenda. In the event of a failed referendum, a limited… CONTINUE READING