Ideological Media Bias

@article{Stone2009IdeologicalMB,
  title={Ideological Media Bias},
  author={Daniel F. Stone},
  journal={ERN: Monopoly},
  year={2009}
}
I develop a model of the market for news in which consumers and reporters both ideologically misinterpret information and have biased beliefs about the extent to which others misinterpret information. I show that for some parameter values, in equilibrium: (i) a monopolist media outlet hires a politically moderate reporter but duopolist outlets use relatively extreme, differentiated reporters; (ii) in duopoly, consumers think of their preferred outlet's news reporter as relatively unbiased and… Expand
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