Identity, intensionality, and intentionality

@article{Tomberlin2004IdentityIA,
  title={Identity, intensionality, and intentionality},
  author={James E. Tomberlin},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2004},
  volume={61},
  pages={111-131}
}
Identity, it has been remarked, is a rather elementary concept, and so it may be. I surmise however that we shall never possess a steady comprehension of this notion until it is satisfactorily explained how one may entertain thoughts concerning a certain object without ever engaging these very thoughts about another object, when a modicum of common sense demands that these objects are one and the same. From Dame Jane's Philosophical Notebook 
2 Citations

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