Identity, intensionality, and intentionality
@article{Tomberlin2004IdentityIA, title={Identity, intensionality, and intentionality}, author={James E. Tomberlin}, journal={Synthese}, year={2004}, volume={61}, pages={111-131} }
Identity, it has been remarked, is a rather elementary concept, and so it may be. I surmise however that we shall never possess a steady comprehension of this notion until it is satisfactorily explained how one may entertain thoughts concerning a certain object without ever engaging these very thoughts about another object, when a modicum of common sense demands that these objects are one and the same. From Dame Jane's Philosophical Notebook
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