Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation

  title={Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation},
  author={Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={333 - 337}
  • Dan ReiterA. Stam
  • Published 1 May 2003
  • Political Science
  • American Political Science Review
Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry (2002) find that interstate dyads containing a democracy and a personalist dictatorship are more likely than other types of dyads to experience militarized disputes. They argue that this is because democracies are especially likely to challenge personalist dictatorships. Unfortunately, they do not identify which state in a conflictual dyad initiated the dispute and so cannot present data to support their claim. We improve on their research design by using… 

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