Identification in Auctions with Selective Entry ∗

  title={Identification in Auctions with Selective Entry ∗},
  author={Matthew Gentry and Tong Li},
This paper considers nonparametric identi cation of a two-stage entry and bidding game we call the A liated-Signal (AS) model. This model assumes that potential bidders have private values, observe signals of their values prior to entry, and then choose whether to undertake a costly entry process, but imposes only minimal structure on the relationship between signals and values. It thereby nests a wide range of entry processes, including in particular the Samuelson (1985) and Levin and Smith… CONTINUE READING
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