Identification and Estimation of Incentive Problems : Adverse Selection ∗

@inproceedings{dHaultfoeuille2007IdentificationAE,
  title={Identification and Estimation of Incentive Problems : Adverse Selection ∗},
  author={Xavier d’Haultfoeuille and Philippe F{\'e}vrier},
  year={2007}
}
The adverse selection model is a principal-agent model defined by the objective function of the principal, the agents’ utility function and the distribution of agents’ types. We prove that the nonparametric identification of this model requires the knowledge of at least one of the three functions. We also show that some exogenous changes in the objective function of the principal are sufficient to obtain partial or full nonparametric identification of the model. A nonparametric estimation… CONTINUE READING

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