Identification and Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information

@inproceedings{Bajari2004IdentificationAE,
  title={Identification and Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information},
  author={Patrick Bajari and Han Hong and Stephen P. Ryan},
  year={2004}
}
We discuss the identification and estimation of discrete games of complete information. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model where utility depends on the actions of other players. Using recent algorithms to compute all of the Nash equilibria to a game, we propose simulation-based estimators for static, discrete games. With appropriate exclusion restrictions about how covariates enter into payoffs and influence… CONTINUE READING

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