Identi Þ cation of Standard Auction Models

@inproceedings{Athey2001IdentiC,
  title={Identi Þ cation of Standard Auction Models},
  author={Susan Athey and Philip A. Haile},
  year={2001}
}
We present new identiÞcation results for models of Þrst-price, second-price, ascending (English), and descending (Dutch) auctions. We analyze a general speciÞcation of the latent demand and information structure, nesting as special cases the pure private values and pure common values models, and allowing both ex ante symmetric and asymmetric bidders. We address identiÞcation of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions that enable discrimination between models on the basis of… CONTINUE READING

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